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THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING OF 
CONTEMPT IS CONTRARY TO LAW. THE 
DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE 
DISCRETION TO FIND APPELLANT IN 
CONTEMPT. 
Appellee argues that a decision to hold a party in contempt is discretionary with the trial 
court. (Brief of Appellee Pg. 8). Marsh v. Marsh, 973 P.2d 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) is cited by 
Appellee regarding the discretionary nature of holding a party in contempt. Marsh involved a 
trial court's refusal to find the wife in a divorce related proceeding in contempt. The wife 
violated a divorce decree by not making mortgage payments resulting in the property being lost 
to foreclosure. 
The husband argued wife should be held in contempt because wife failed to hold husband 
harmless on the mortgage. The divorce decree specifically required wife to hold husband 
harmless on the mortgage. The wife argued she was not able to make the payments because the 
husband failed to pay child support. The District Court refused to hold the wife in contempt. 
The Brief of Appellant specifies the requirements for contempt. These requirements are 
not limited to discretion of a trial court. (Brief of Appellant Arguments Point I, through V, Pgs. 
15-25). Marsh supports Appellant's position stating: 
... To find contempt, the court must find from clear 
and convincing proof that the contemnor knew what 
was required, had the ability to comply, and 
willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so. 
(Citation omitted.) 
973 P.2d 988 @ 990. 
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The legal standard established by the cases cited by Appellee support Appellant's 
position. The District Court did not have discretion to find Appellant in contempt. The District 
Court was required to find by clear and convincing evidence that an Order of Court was violated. 
The specific knowledge, ability to comply and willful and knowing requirements must be met. If 
discretion is to be exercised it is after the legal requirements have been met. 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO MAKE 
FINDINGS ON THE THREE ELEMENTS 
REQUIRED FOR A FINDING OF CONTEMPT. 
Appellee argues that the Court finding that Respondent was aware of the Decree and had 
the capacity to follow the Decree is sufficient. (Brief of Appellee Pgs. 9-14.) However, Kelly v. 
Kelly, 9 P.3d 171, (Utah App. 2000), requires clear and convincing proof of all three elements of 
contempt. Marsh v. Marsh, infra as cited in Point I establishes the same requirement. The 
District Court's findings do not include these three elements. 
Being aware that there was a Decree of Divorce does not meet the requirement that the 
Appellant knew what was required. While the Appellee argues that the District Court found that 
the Respondent had the ability to comply with the Decree, there is no finding as to what was 
required by the Decree itself. The ability to comply requirement isn't met unless what is 
required is established and the ability to comply is then determined. Finally, there is no finding 
that the Appellant acted willfully. Consequently, the Appellee's position that the trial court 
made the proper findings and properly applied the law is wrong. The Appellee does not address 
the error with the Court's findings being found by clear and convincing evidence. 
Appellant points out the errors by the District Court without Appellee addressing the 
errors. For example, Finding of Fact 3 by the Court is not responded to by Appellee. This 
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Finding suggests Appellant should have lied to his children. This is not a basis for finding the 
Appellant had the ability to comply with the Decree. 
POINT III 
APPELLEE IMPROPERLY ATTEMPTS TO 
UTILIZE FINDINGS RESPECTING PRIOR 
EVENTS AS THE BASIS FOR FINDING A 
SUBSEQUENT EVENT TO CONSTITUTE 
CONTEMPT. 
Apellee argues that the District Court's finding of contempt is justified by non-
compliance by Appellant of a previous Court Order. (Brief of Appellee Pgs. 13-14.) The 
previous proceedings involved unrelated issues. The previous issues related to additional child 
support based on business gross receipts and similar matters. The District Court's ruling 
involving these prior issues does not replace legal requirements for finding contempt. The 
statutory, constitutional and judicial requirements that Appellant knew what was required, had 
the ability to comply and intentionally failed or refused to do so are not based on prior 
proceeings. 
Appellee also argues that a judgment remained unpaid. Not only does the judgment from 
the prior proceedings not relate to the current issues, the judgment is not subject to paymenx. 
The Appellant posted a supersedeas bond upon the filing of the appeal. A party cannot be held 
in contempt while exercising the party's right to appeal. 
As Appellee noted, this Court issued an opinion in the appeal of the earlier proceedings 
on January 3, 2008. This decision, Anderson v. Thompson, 594 Ut. Adv. Rep 3 (Ut. Ct. App. 
2008), reversed the District Court regarding evidence wrongly admitted from settlement 
documents, affirmed the District Court regarding the amounts owed by Appellant and reversed 
and remanded the case regarding attorney's fees. The remand is still before the District Court. 
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This prior appeal is not a basis for the District Court's finding of contempt in the second 
proceeding. There is no iintiing by iwc i>:siiici t OLJ.-I I.U.I ii.ese laciors. me unpa... :•,;; indued 
for judgment or additional child support had not been paid formed the basis for the District 
Court's finding of contempt in the second proceeding. If this were the case, such a position 
would be an abuse of discretion by the Court. The basis for the action was a family meeting and 
two checks. Prior findings of contempt on unrelated issues are not at issue in this case. If they 
POINT I \ 
A l)i VOilCE DECRPP IS IN fPRPRKrhl) I :M .:G 
CONTRACT INTERPRETATION RULES. 
Appellee argues that the Decree of Divorce is to be interpreted as an Order of Court.. 
((kief of Appellee I\i. I(' ) \\ illmnf u'tiiU', aullmrih, Appellee slates "a nianiagc may fx- an 
enforceable contract between two individuals bul the resulting Decree of Divorce is not a 
contr - . - • ' . • i - * ' i •• ' .- • a • ru1 • > a 
interpretation of a conliacl. In Moonjy'._Moo.n, 973 P.2d 43 ! (la \i>(>. * 9'^ )*. the Court stated: 
"w e interpret a di\ orce decree according to established i "tiles of conti act interpi etation ' ' Se e 
also, Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 928 (I Jt. App. 1998) and Ford v. Intermountain Farmers 
Association, 90 ; I \2d 264, 268 (I Jtah 1995). 
In Web Bank v. American General Annuity Service Corp., 54 P.3d 1139
 vUt. 2002), the 
Utah Supreme court stated the fundamental rules of construction applicable to a contract. The 
Court stated: 
In interpreting a contract, "we look to the writing 
itself to ascertain the parties' intentions, and we 
consider each contract provision... in relation to all 
of the others, with a view toward giving effect to all 
and ignoring none." (Citations omitted.) 
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The Appellee acknowledges that the Order of Court Appellee relies on is one phrase from 
one sentence in one paragraph related to joint custody. (Brief of Appellee Pg. 9.) The 
interpretation rules applicable to such a phrase as explained in the Brief of Appellant and as 
stated in Web Bank require giving all provisions of an Order effect. Appellee's interpretation is 
wrong. A phrase contained in a sentence contained in a paragraph related to joint custody cannot 
be singled out and given separate meaning apart from the rest of the paragraph. 
In Bettinger v. Bettinger, 793 P.2d 389 (Utah App. 1990), the Court faced an issue of 
interpretation regarding a divorce decree. The Court stated: 
A judgment must be enforced as written if the 
language is clear and unambiguous. However, 
ambiguous judgments are subject to the same rules 
of construction that apply to all written instruments 
and "the entire record may be resorted to for the 
purpose of construing the judgment". The 
determination of whether a contract is ambiguous is, 
at the outset, a question of law. "If a trial court 
finds the agreement unambiguous and interprets its 
meaning by examining only the words of the 
agreement, this interpretation also presents a 
question of law." Therefore, we are not required to 
give the trial court interpretation of an unambiguous 
judgment any particular weight, but review its 
interpretation under a correctness standard. 
However, if the trial court determines the language 
is ambiguous and finds facts based upon extrinsic 
evidence, appellate review of such findings is 
limited to determining whether they are based on 
substantial, competent, admissible evidence. 
The language of Paragraph 3 of the Decree of Divorce is clear and unambiguous when 
the entire Paragraph is considered. This Paragraph establishes joint custody. To reach 
Appellee's interpretation as adopted by the District Court, one single phrase is given effect and 
the rest of the Paragraph is ignored. At best, the Appellee's argument suggests there is 
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ambiguity as to what Paragraph 3 means. The District Court,, however, did not rule, as a matter 
of law, that Paragraph 3 was ambiguous. 
POINT V 
THlSUHJKl jN 111I-: 1-1KST APPEAL Ol- i i ! :• 
MATTLR, ESTABLISHED THE BASIS FOR 
AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES. FEES MUST 
MEET THE REQUIREMENT S OF UTAH CODE 
ANN. §30-3-3. FINDINGS MEETING THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE STATUTE MI 1ST BE 
MADE. 
In Anderson v. Thompson, 594 I I. Adv. Rep. 3, the Court addressed attorney's fees in 
circumstances w here the Com I: f()i md A ppellant o;vv ed additional child si ippoi I: and other amounts 
aiici was in contempt of c oui t. 1 his (\nirl ruled (hat (he requirements of Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 
the necessary findings. This Court stated: 
icr Utah Code section 30-3-3, a trial court "may 
T a party to pay the costs, attorney's fees, and 
.»•.. iess fees... of the other party to enable the other 
party to prosecute or defend the action." "!n doing 
so, however, the trial court must base its award of 
attorney's fees "on evidence of the receiving 
spouse's financial need, the payor spouse's ability 
to pay, and the reasonableness of the requested 
fees" further, "the decision to award attorney's 
r
.- V must be based on sufficient findings regarding 
HuMors"' (Citations omitted.) 
1
 lerson v. Thompson, 594 I . Adv. Rep. 3. -a par. 4'i (I Jt Ct. App 2008). 
1 he District Coi trt in this proceeding did not apply I Itah Code A nn §30-3-3 ' I he 
District Court did not make the findings required by Anderson v. Thompson. The District court 
further refused to awai d fees to i Appellant oi reduce t appellee's fees based on the i Vppel h iiit 
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prevailing on the significant issue in this proceeding. This issue was Appellee's claim that 
Appellant owed more child support in January, February and March, 2007. 
The District Court's refusal to award fees to Appellant or reduce Appellee's fees is 
specifically addressed by Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3. The requirements of Utah Code Ann. §30-3-
3(2) apply to this proceeding. Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3(2) provides: 
In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-
time, child support, alimony, or division of property 
in a domestic case, the court may award costs and 
attorney's fees upon determining that the party 
substantially prevailed upon the claim or defense. 
The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or 
limited fees against the party if the court finds the 
party is impecunious or enters in the record the 
reasons for not awarding fees. 
In this case, the trial court did not apply this statute. The Court did not consider that the 
Appellant was the prevailing party on the claim that the Appellant had not paid the correct child 
support for January, February and March, 2007. The Appellant, the prevailing party, should 
have been able awarded his costs attorney's fees with respect to the issue of child support. This 
fee award would apply unless the District Court found the Appellee impecunious or entered 
reasons for not awarding fees. 
POINT VI 
THE REQUIRED FACTS FOR DECIDING THIS 
APPEAL HAVE BEEN PRESENTED. 
Appellee argues that how the appeal should be dismissed because the facts were not 
marshaled. (Brief of Appellee Argument: Point Two.) Appellee argues that a Finding of Fact is 
being challenged and all record evidence supporting the finding has not been marshaled. See 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 24(a)(9). 
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The issues in this appeal involve errors of law by the District Court and the Findings of 
the District Court that do not meet the requirements of law. The issues in this appeal are matters 
of law. The issues of law are the constitutional requirement that a party be afforded due process 
in a contempt proceeding; the statutory requirement that an Order of the Court be violated; the 
making of Findings of Fact meeting the three requirements for contempt; finding that the 
required Findings were found by clear and convincing evidence; and complying with Utah Code 
Ann. §30-3-3 regarding attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant is entitled to reversal of the District Court decision. There is no violation of an 
Order of Court meeting the constitutional, statutory and judicial requirements for a finding of 
contempt. There has been no finding by clear and convincing evidence of any violation of a 
legally sufficient Court Order. Attorney's fees should have been awarded to the Appellant. This 
case should be remanded for an award of the Appellant's attorney's fees including fees on 
appeal. 
Dated this 25th day of February, 2008. 
BRUCE L. RICHARDS & ASSOCIATES 
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